Can Washington counter China in the Solomons and beyond?

Solomon Islands PM survives no-confidence vote after unrest - BBC News

At this point, it should be clear that the Solomon Islands, led by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, is giving up on democracy and getting closer and closer to the People’s Republic of China. Since coming to power in April 2019, the Sogavare government has taken a number of actions that are getting worse for the US, its allies, and the stability of the region as a whole. Luckily, the risks that come with Chinese control of the Solomon Islands seem to have made Washington realize how important the South Pacific is from a strategic point of view. In case of war, the US shouldn’t have to worry about China spreading its power across Oceania. Instead, it should act quickly to strengthen its position in the South Pacific and help Canberra and Wellington do the same.

Washington can really step up its game in the region for a small amount of money. Only Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga have standing armies at the moment. Vanuatu’s main armed force is the Vanuatu Mobile Force, which is a paramilitary police force. Too long, Beijing has been able to make a lot of progress as the security partner of choice for these countries, mostly by filling in the gaps left when Western powers cut aid in response to backsliding at home. Now, Washington has a chance to move on from past mistakes and improve these important relationships. To do this, it should strengthen its diplomatic ties, work more closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, and grow the popular State Partnership Program, which allows host governments to work with U.S. National Guard units.

Growing Risks

The strategic reasoning behind a strong American presence in the South Pacific hasn’t changed since President John Quincy Adams pushed for a government-funded exploration trip to map the area in the 1800s. Adams knew that the South Pacific was a key way to get to East Asia, both for business and for military reasons. Adams was the first president to buy coaling stations and naval bases for the United States all over the Pacific, including in American Samoa. During both World Wars and the Cold War, U.S. strategists knew that a rival power couldn’t control the South Pacific. This was so that U.S. forces could move from the West Coast and Hawaii to East Asia, and so that Australia and New Zealand could keep getting supplies. In fact, this was part of the thinking behind allied campaigns in World War II, from Coral Sea to Guadalcanal to New Guinea.

If Beijing got military access in the South Pacific, whether it was a permanent base or just regular air or naval transit and refueling rights, it would be a serious threat to Washington’s strategy, which has been in place for hundreds of years. About 1,100 miles separate the Solomons from northern Australia. A Chinese presence on the archipelago or on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea would be a good way to show power in the important sea lanes that go to and from Australia. The United States just recently learned how dangerous it could be for China to try to get military access to Kiribati, a country in the Eastern Pacific about 1,800 miles from Hawaii.

Now, events in the Solomon Islands are making this threat even bigger. One of the first things Sogavare did when he became president was to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Since then, the Solomon Islands have moved quickly toward China. In April 2022, they signed a security agreement with Beijing and used Chinese advisors to train their police. The country also signed an agreement with China for a $66 million loan to build Huawei communication towers.

Sogavare has made it clear that he doesn’t like the traditional security partners of the Solomon Islands, which are the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. When U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and U.S. Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy visited the Solomons in August, Sogavare refused to attend a ceremony to remember the Battle of Guadalcanal, where more than 7,000 Allied soldiers died. Shortly after that, his government didn’t answer requests for port calls from the U.S. Coast Guard and the British Royal Navy. As a result, there was a lot of anger, so Sogavare banned all foreign warship visits (although it is unclear whether this applies to China, given their security pact). Later, ships from Australia were allowed to come back, but ships from the United States and the United Kingdom were still limited.

Worryingly, Sogavare’s preference for Beijing goes hand in hand with a strong authoritarian streak. He wants to put off parliamentary elections on the questionable grounds that Solomon Islands can’t afford to host the upcoming Pacific Games and still be a democracy. When Australia offered to pay for the elections so that they could go as planned, Sogavare said that Canberra was interfering in Honiara’s business.

Things like what is happening in Solomon Islands are not unique in the South Pacific. People have said that Beijing has actively looked for places to put military bases on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, Black Rock in Fiji, and Luganville Wharf in Vanuatu. China’s economic influence has been bad all over the South Pacific, from Samoa to Vanuatu and even the Cook Islands, which are self-governing but have a free association with New Zealand. This is mostly because of the Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, China has given these states debts that they can’t pay back, which has upset local politics and changed the way people have always lived.

How far outsourcing can go

So far, the United States has tried to divide up the work in the Pacific Islands in a way that makes sense and takes advantage of the historical ties, close location, and cultural similarities of its Australian and New Zealand partners. Canberra has often paid attention to the Melanesian states of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, while Wellington focuses on Polynesia, which includes Samoa, Tonga, and the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, which are part of Tonga. The United States has always been interested in the Central and North Pacific states of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia through its Compacts of Free Association.

In the current situation, where Chinese ambitions are growing across the region and direct U.S. interests are being threatened more and more, Washington can no longer send its South Pacific diplomacy to Canberra and Wellington. Now is the time for the U.S. to join more multilateral groups in the South Pacific, such as the Forum Fisheries Agency and the Pacific Community. The Biden Administration’s decision to increase U.S. representation at the Pacific Islands Forum is a good start. However, being a “Pacific Power” in both words and actions also means embedding diplomatic and security observers and liaisons across multilateral organizations, making sure high-level participation at regional meetings, and following through on the promises made after these meetings.

The way Washington organizes its bureaucracy has a lot to do with how well its regional policies work. The Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department has a deputy assistant secretary for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. At the Department of Defense, Oceania is in charge of a deputy assistant secretary for East Asia. It goes without saying that the Pacific doesn’t always get the attention it needs when Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all want to be seen. The Pentagon should make a position similar to the State Department’s to make sure that the U.S. pays full strategic attention to this important region and that a high-ranking official is directly in charge of putting into action an aggressive agenda that promotes U.S. interests.

This plan for a stronger U.S. role in the South Pacific does not mean that Canberra and Wellington should no longer lead in Melanesia and Polynesia, respectively. In a time when money is tight and people have a lot of responsibilities, the United States should make the most of its allies and partners. But recent events have also shown that Washington needs to step up because Beijing is getting stronger in the South Pacific. No longer can the United States’ interests in Oceania be left to other countries without risk.

Use the National Guard.

Already, the U.S. National Guard is an important part of growing U.S. power in the Pacific. For example, the Nevada National Guard’s program in Fiji and Tonga has been a key link with military institutions that Beijing is trying hard to get closer to. In Papua New Guinea, the Wisconsin National Guard set up a State Partnership in 2020. Under this program, local military units are paired with U.S. National Guard units, which act as mentors in key areas. In the Pacific Islands, training and practical advice about helping people in need, responding to disasters, fighting drugs, and even getting rid of unexploded ordnance can build important relationships and teach valuable skills.

But these programs need to go further and include the police and paramilitary forces, which in most of Oceania are the main armed forces. Beijing has paid a lot of attention to the Vanuatu Mobile Force, for example, and it should be a part of the State Partnership Program. The expertise that U.S. National Guard units bring to the area would help police and law enforcement agencies all over the area. Another good idea for Oceania is the Civic Action Team program, which is already being used in Palau and other places. This program brings together teams from different services and local communities to work on small-scale projects that help people in real ways and build a lot of goodwill. For example, they might fix bicycles for kids in the community or help strengthen key infrastructure during typhoon season. The ties made through these relationships will directly increase the U.S.’s regional power and give Beijing a good counterbalance, especially after disasters like the Tonga earthquake of 2022, when the U.S.’s response was pathetically weak compared to China’s.

For U.S. interests in Oceania, the U.S. Coast Guard is another important force multiplier. Illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing is one of the biggest security problems the Pacific islands face. It hurts local economies and ecosystems and takes away from the islands’ sovereignty. China is a major problem in the South Pacific because it has a global fishing fleet and doesn’t follow basic rules of how to behave at sea. In this fight, the U.S. Coast Guard can work with local police and coast guards through Shiprider Agreements, which put local officers on U.S. ships to look for illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing. The Coast Guard needs to be more present in the South Pacific and work with Pacific partners like Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu in a more aggressive way. To do this, the Biden Administration can finish the work started by its predecessor to set up a permanent Coast Guard station on American Samoa. By putting fast response cutters there, the Coast Guard’s presence in Oceania would grow. This would help stop illegal fishing and Chinese gray zone activities and strengthen ties with South Pacific countries, which would show more trust, openness, and honesty in return for the increased American presence.

The last few years have taught us a clear lesson: Beijing is determined to get a foothold in the South Pacific, which poses a direct threat to U.S. and allied long-term interests. Without a clear strategy of denial and the right use of U.S. power in this area, important U.S. interests will be in danger. It is time for the United States to back a wide range of defense projects all over Oceania, including in countries where we are still openly worried about democracy, and rightly so. If the United States increases its presence in and political ties to this dynamic region, it is more likely to play a positive role in promoting good governance than if it continues to let Beijing and its proxies take the lead. By putting out more resources now, Washington has a chance to stop a totally unneeded strategic surprise from happening in the future.

By Rheychell Gomez

Rheychell Gomez, a graduate of De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde, ventured into journalism with a focus on San Juan's local governance. Her comedic routines delve into the intricacies of living in one of Metro Manila’s smallest cities, highlighting the humor in the everyday with a journalist’s eye for detail.